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AGAINST UTILITARIAN 
FUNDAMENTALISM 
ROBERT P. MERGES† 
INTRODUCTION 
I was tempted to pull punches in the title of this piece, but I 
thought better of it for three reasons.  First, the essay I am 
responding to—“Faith-Based IP” (“FBIP”)1—itself pulls no 
punches.  Second, the title I chose captures what I want to say.2  
Third, I am an inveterate punch puller and thought I would try 
something different. 
My overall point is that there are many paths to the truth.  
Not just one.  To privilege one path is bad enough, in my book; it 
excludes others that may lead to valuable insights.  But to choose 
one path and accuse those on other paths of being exclusionary—
that goes too far. 
This is especially true where some of those on other paths 
have tried very hard to be generous and inclusive.  To have 
labored in an effort to include other views and to state my own as 
modestly as possible and then be labeled a wild-eyed, 
exclusionary zealot was not pleasant. 
I make three points in this Essay.  First, that the idea of 
“faith-based IP” is misleading.  The thrust of the “faith-based” 
critique is that (1) nonempirical reasoning is inherently suspect; 
(2) any theory that is not strictly empirical is based on 
fundamental commitments that are resistant to 
counterarguments, particularly empirically based 
counterarguments; and (3) as a consequence, nonempirically 
 
† Wilson, Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati Professor of Law and Technology, UC 
Berkeley School of Law. Thanks to all the participants in the St. John’s Law School 
Conference on Values, Questions, and Methods in Intellectual Property. Remaining 
errors are mine. 
1 Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 
(2015). 
2 It would be more honest to say I “borrowed” the title; it was suggested to me 
by Justin Hughes, of the Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
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based theories of IP are beyond the pale of scholarly discourse, 
because those who advocate these theories operate in the realm 
of religious belief—“faith,” in its pejorative sense—rather than 
hard-headed reason.  I counter each of these points and argue 
that the critique, though common enough in philosophical 
debates, is as wrong here as it has been elsewhere.  There are 
ways of reasoning that are not based on strictly empirical data.  
And belief in these forms of rationality does not equate to “faith” 
in the pejorative sense.  People reason in nonstrictly empirical 
ways about what is right, and what is wrong, and have done so 
for a very long time.  These very same people are often not 
resistant to empirical data.  Indeed, one novel aspect of my 
argument is that empirical data have helped researchers to 
understand the strength and universality of people’s sense of 
right and wrong—a powerful answer to the FBIP critique that 
deontological theories are somehow resistant to empirical 
evidence. 
Second, I take pains to recapitulate some of the arguments 
in my book, Justifying IP (“JIP”).3  The ones relevant to this 
Essay are that (1) some people are personally unconvinced by the 
empirical case for the existence of IP law—that is, the empirical 
foundations of the field; (2) other rationales for IP are available, 
some of which are convincing—though, of course, not to everyone; 
and (3) at the operational level, beyond the issue of foundations, 
empirical evidence is important in deciding on the details of how 
to operate an IP system—once the decision to have one is made. 
Third, I take aim at the concluding portion of FBIP, which 
says that those who disagree with the case for empirical 
foundations cannot take part in a scholarly conversation with 
utilitarians/empiricists.  FBIP says people such as these “have 
nothing to say” to those who do buy the case for empirical 
foundations.  In JIP, I anticipated just this species of 
“foundational exclusion” and tried my best to preempt it.  My 
strategy was drawn from pluralist political theory, particularly 
the work of the late John Rawls.4  I said then, and still believe 
now, that one of the virtues of policy conversations in the IP field 
is that they take place at a level above those of fundamental 
commitments.  Indeed, I used the phrase “room at the bottom” to 
 
3 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 9 (2011). 
4 Id. at 9–10, 104. 
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denote the foundational pluralism I had in mind.  The very idea 
of a “bottom layer” of IP theory was to cordon off foundation-level 
commitments from prosaic policy debates in IP law.  The explicit 
purpose of this multi-tiered construct was to guard against 
exclusionary claims regarding one or another set of foundational 
commitments.  I tried, in other words, to be clear that we need a 
“public space” in which we can debate IP policy regardless of our 
personal foundational commitments.  This is not close minded or 
restrictive; quite the opposite. 
I. THE CRITIQUE OF NONSTRICTLY EMPIRICAL IP THEORY 
FBIP is a highly charged rhetorical performance that also 
makes some interesting theoretical points.5  It makes three 
 
5 I use rhetoric here in the sense of an appeal to emotion rather than reason—a 
slightly pejorative denotation for a term that, in its more neutral hues, means 
simply argumentation in all its forms. Compare Rhetoric, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/rhetoric (last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (defining it as 
“the undue use of exaggeration or display; bombast”), with id. at British Dictionary 
meaning 2 (defining it as “the art of using speech to persuade, influence, or please”). 
FBIP uses rhetoric, in this sense, primarily to damn nonstrictly empirical theories of 
IP by association with religious fundamentalism—I use the same technique in the 
title of this piece; touché. The rhetoric is skillful and subtle. Here is an example: 
Because that is a belief, evidence cannot shake it any more than I can 
persuade someone who believes in the literal truth of the bible that his god 
didn’t create the world in seven days. Sure, there may be geological and 
archeological evidence that makes the seven-day story implausible. But 
faith is not just ambivalent about evidentiary support; it is remarkably 
resistant to evidentiary challenge. 
Lemley, supra note 1, at 1338. Here, belief in different types of rational evidence—
such as arguments from Kantian first principles or normative ethical arguments 
generally—are implicitly equated to stubborn, irrational beliefs, such as those of 
creationists and flat earthers. Doubts about the adequacy of empirical data are 
transmuted into an unshakeable resistance to all empirical proof. In other words, to 
abandon the solid world of empirical foundations is to automatically commit to a 
stubbornly irrational set of foundations. The rhetoric is extreme and polarizing. In 
fact, it commits precisely the error that FBIP attributes to others. It takes an 
extreme position, cutting off conversation and debate. In technical—and neutral 
rhetorical—terms, it is fallacious. See Matthew Finn, In Defence of Deontological 
Justifications of Intellectual Property 2 (Nov. 14, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2690947 (“Latching on to Merges’s use of the word ‘faith,’ Lemley calls this recent 
development ‘faith-based IP.’ There are two ways of understanding his argument. 
The first, which is suggested by the Merges quote, is that the IP adherents believe in 
IP because of their faith, independently of the justifications. Despite what they say, 
they do not believe in IP because of the deontological justifications. Rather, these 
justifications are offered in bad faith or as post-hoc rationalizations. The problem 
with this argument is that it is an ad hominem fallacy. It is an attack against the IP 
adherents rather than against their arguments. Even if the IP adherents’ belief in 
IP is based on faith, the deontological justifications of IP could still be valid.” 
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arguments: (1) reasoning that is not based on strictly empirical 
evidence is unscientific and unpersuasive; (2) this is so because 
by definition such reasoning resists refutation and is therefore 
akin to foundational religious beliefs; and (3) as a result, 
adherents of such reasoning do not and cannot take part in true 
scholarly exchange—their zealotry has cut them off from rational 
argumentation. 
A. Strict Adherence to Empirical Data Is the One True Path 
To understand the first claim in FBIP, it is best to consider 
its words directly: 
Merges refers to his “faith” in IP law, and that is exactly the 
right word.  I call this retreat from evidence faith-based IP, both 
because adherents are taking the validity of the IP system on 
faith and because the rationale for doing so is a form of religious 
belief.  The adherents of this new religion believe in IP.6 
Next, we read: 
 
(footnotes omitted)). As is clear from the main text, I disagree with Finn that the use 
of the word “faith” in JIP suggests a belief in IP systems independent of 
justifications. The faith spoken of is because of those justifications. Faith or belief 
can be based on authority, but also on evidence of other kinds. And the evidence of 
human reason about right and wrong—deontological reasoning—can be just as valid 
or solid as strictly empirical evidence. Finn is not alone in characterizing the tone of 
FBIP. See James Grimmelman, Faith-Based Intellectual Property: A Response, THE 
LABORATORIUM (2D SER.) (Apr. 21, 2015), http://2d.laboratorium.net/post/ 
117023858730/faith-based-intellectual-property-a-response (“This is how pundits 
and politicians argue all the time. It is a little startling to see such rhetoric used in a 
debate among academics. . . . ‘Faith’ is a pejorative in the language of academic 
discourse. Lemley’s essay is an attempt to turn a scholarly debate into a culture 
war. . . . [I]t harnesses intellectual property law—not usually thought of as a fraught 
subject—to genuinely divisive controversies. . . . This kind of culturally charged 
polarization might or might not be an effective tactic in pushing back against strong 
intellectual property laws. But it is a disappointing development for intellectual 
property scholarship.”). See also Lawrence Solum, Lemley on Non-consequentialist 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:30 
AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2015/04/lemley-on-non-consequentialist-
justifications-for-intellectual-property.html (“Lemley argues that the classic figures 
in the social-contract tradition (for example, Locke and Rawls) did not themselves 
discuss IP. This is a version of the argument from authority (perfectly valid when 
discussing legal issues where there is ‘authority’ from the internal point of view), but 
simply fallacious as an approach to moral and political philosophy. And Lemley 
makes an ad hominen argument that the advocates of non-consequentialist 
justifications are motivated by ‘faith,’ but this kind of argument is a classic informal 
fallacy.”). 
6 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1337 (footnote omitted). 
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Now, you can think what you like about religion.  I know lots of 
people who find value in it.  But IP strikes me as an odd thing 
to make the basis of one’s faith, for several reasons.  First, once 
one abandons utilitarianism it is hard to find a basis for a pre-
political right to IP.7 
And then: 
[T]hey turn to some version of the “I made it and so I own it,” 
often attributing that sentiment to John Locke, or Hegel, or, 
more recently, Rawls.  But those theories have more than their 
fair share of problems, starting with the fact that none of these 
latter-day prophets of IP actually included IP at all in their 
theories.8 
Note the rhetoric: “latter-day prophets.”  Then later, “the IP 
faithful.”9  Also, “that sentiment,” as opposed to “that idea” or 
“that theory.”  The subtle reinforcement of the primary theme—
deontology equals religion equals unreason—is artful, but no 
more defensible than the general thrust of the article.  To 
compare nonconsequentialist IP theories to irrational, 
unscientific beliefs is to commit two very large errors.  The first 
is to collapse all “opposing” theories—all those not 
empiricist/utilitarian—into a single derogatory category.  The 
second and larger error is to raise the empirical/utilitarian theory 
to the status of the one and only true path, the sole road to 
enlightenment.  By collecting all competing theories into a single 
bundle and labeling that bundle as atavistic, naïve, irrational, 
and backward, FBIP makes it quite clear there really is no other 
alternative to its way of thought.  And this article says its 
opponents are narrow-minded!  If that line of reasoning does not 
raise a chuckle then you will probably never find any source of 
amusement in academic debate. 
To be fair, JIP does use the word “faith”—and that invokes, 
for some anyway, a cascade into the dark realm of antiscience 
and irrational, atavistic, primitive, belief.  But, judge for yourself 
whether FBIP has it right that this represents a “retreat from 
evidence,” a refusal to accept clear and solid facts.  Here is the 
passage containing the reference to “faith”: 
[T]ry as I might, there was a truth I could never quite get 
around: the data are maddeningly inconclusive.  In my opinion, 
 
7 Id. at 1338. 
8 Id. at 1338–39 (footnotes omitted). 
9 Id. at 1343. 
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they support a fairly solid case in favor of IP protection—but not 
a lock-solid, airtight case, a case we can confidently take to an 
unbiased jury of hardheaded social scientists. 
And yet, through all the doubts over empirical proof, my faith in 
the necessity and importance of IP law has only grown.  I seem 
to have a lot of company.  Countless judges begin their IP 
decisions with one or another familiar “stage setter” about how 
IP protection exists to serve the public interest, often intoning 
one of a few stock passages penned in a spare moment by 
Thomas Jefferson.10 
Here is an author who believes that the available empirical 
evidence supports a “fairly solid case” in favor of an IP system, 
just not a solid enough case to be completely convincing.  Is this a 
“retreat from evidence?”  Is this a refusal to face facts when they 
undermine a strongly held belief?  If facts and evidence do not 
matter at all, why mention them?  Does the invocation of 
“[c]ountless judges” seem like a statement about “a form of 
religious belief”?  Are there really that many die-hard absolutist 
defenders of IP in the judiciary?  And so on.  Quoting the full 
passage only highlights that this is an author not rejecting 
empirical evidence of all kinds, but expressing honest doubts 
about the adequacy of the available evidence.  Taking a snippet 
from such a passage makes for a good straw man.  But it is more 
in the way of propaganda than scholarship. 
Context aside, the word “faith” need not denote religious 
faith.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word as 
“trust . . . or reliance upon . . . the efficacy or worth of a thing.”11  
Further, one definition of “belief” is “mental . . . acceptance of 
a . . . proposition, statement or fact . . . [as true,] on the ground[] 
[of] authority . . . [or] evidence.”12  Faith in this broader, more 
accurate sense, need not stem from religious fervor; if this were 
logically implied, then the phrase “blind faith” would not be 
necessary because all faith would be of this character.  Instead, 
faith can come from a wide variety of sources.  It is not improper, 
for example, to say “on the faith of the empirical evidence, I 
choose to believe X.”  This truth is obscured by the very title of 
 
10 MERGES, supra note 3, at 3. 
11 Faith, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67760? 
rskey=ccW2Sj&result=1#eid (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
12 Belief, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/17368? 
redirectedFrom=belief#eid (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) . 
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FBIP.  The OED defines “faith-based” as “based on religious 
faith.”13  And that is very much the thrust of FBIP.  Consider: 
They don’t believe it is better for the world than other systems, 
or that it encourages more innovation.  Rather, they believe in 
IP as an end in itself—that IP is some kind of prepolitical right 
to which inventors and creators are entitled.  Because that is a 
belief, evidence cannot shake it any more than I can persuade 
someone who believes in the literal truth of the bible that his 
god didn’t create the world in seven days.  Sure, there may be 
geological and archeological evidence that makes the seven-day 
story implausible.  But faith is not just ambivalent about 
evidentiary support; it is remarkably resistant to evidentiary 
challenge.  Indeed, many proponents of this new religion even 
tout that as an advantage for their faith, claiming that it 
“avoids the need for empirical validation demanded by the 
utilitarian approach.”14 
This is wrong in so many ways, it is difficult to get a start on it. 
First, to say that those who believe in deontological theories 
to support a system “don’t believe it is better for the world than 
other systems” is far from misguided.  It could not, in all honesty, 
be much more wrong. 
If moral rules are to guide us, and if we follow those rules in 
deciding on a certain “system,” it is then precisely and exactly the 
case that that system “is better for the world than other 
systems.”  To one who subscribes to deontology, rules guide us to 
what is better.  Our rules say we must judge that system to be 
better.  If that is what the moral rule indicates, it is simply the 
better system.  Judgments about what is better are coextensive 
with application of a deontological approach.  To say one who 
follows deontological reasoning does not think his or her choice is 
better for the world is to speak nonsense.  It is also, as mentioned 
earlier, a way of saying that there is one and only one way to 
judge what is “better for the world”—maximization of wealth, 
happiness, or utils under a utilitarian system.  To repeat:  This 
commits the very type of exclusion—“only my way of thinking is 
right”—that FBIP accuses others of committing. 
 
13 Faith-based, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
67760?redirectedFrom=faith-based#eid4672949 (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
14 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1337–38 (quoting RICHARD A. SPINELLO & MARIA 
BOTTIS, A DEFENSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 150 (2009)). 
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At the same time, JIP does use a theological analogy, saying 
that a search for foundations for IP might be equated with a 
scientist’s search for an answer to the question of where nature 
came from, or what is its purpose.  But I explicitly distanced the 
foundations I was discussing from the theological source in the 
example of the scientist: 
I am not saying that Kant and Locke are in any sense 
theological figures; just that they serve the same purpose for me 
as the spiritual-theological reading does for the scientist in my 
analogy.  They provide a grounding outside the contours of my 
field as conventionally practiced, one that helps me resolve 
foundational doubts and get back to work confidently “inside” 
my field.15 
So, again, there is just no validity at all to the charge that 
JIP—or deontological theory generally—operates at the level of 
religious faith. 
B. Antecedents: Efficiency Versus Justice 
The argument in FBIP goes back quite a ways.  In this sense, 
it is in good company; luminaries such as Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and Richard Posner have embarked on similarly misguided 
missions.16  As political philosopher John Mikhail explained: 
From time to time, lawyers and judges seeking to promote 
economic values such as efficiency and wealth-maximization 
have taken the further step of arguing that competing 
paradigms of jurisprudence based on commonsense notions of 
justice are theoretically inadequate bases on which to ground a 
system of legal rights and obligations.  [Oliver Wendell] Holmes 
himself is a leading example of this tendency.  [Richard] 
Posner’s book [The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 
(1999)] is perhaps the most ambitious attempt yet by a judge to 
attack the foundations of natural justice in order to promote the 
law and economics movement in this way.  It contains many 
telling criticisms of recent professional moral philosophy, 
delivered with a force and directness only a secure outsider can 
provide.  Nonetheless, the book’s central arguments are 
remarkably unsuccessful.  In his zeal to criticize philosophers, 
 
15 MERGES, supra note 3, at 11. 
16 John Mikhail, Note, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner’s 
The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1057–58 (2002). 
For Holmes’s views, see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, 
WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 25 (2000). 
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Posner commits surprising mistakes that suggest he 
misunderstands basic questions, not only of moral philosophy, 
but of jurisprudence as well.17 
The mistake Posner makes is very close to FBIP’s point that 
commitments based on nonempirical foundations cannot be 
influenced by rational evidence.  According to Posner, “there are 
no general moral principles, just particular moral intuitions.”18  
Moral philosopher John Mikhail critiques the Posner view: 
Posner takes for granted the standard “particularist” 
assumption that moral judgments are made on a case-by-case 
basis, without the support of moral principles.  This assumption 
is incompatible with the best explanation of the properties of 
moral judgment.  To explain how the normal individual is able 
to make stable and systematic moral judgments about an 
indefinite number of novel cases, we must assume she is guided, 
implicitly, by a system of principles or rules.  Without this 
assumption, her ability to make these judgments—and our 
ability to predict them—would be inexplicable.  Posner’s 
insistence that the capacity for moral judgment consists of 
nothing more than “theoretically ungrounded and ungroundable 
preferences and aversions” is therefore suspect from the start.19 
C. Alternatives to Strict Empiricism Are Unscientific and 
Against Enlightenment Values 
FBIP accuses nonstrict empiricists of abjuring the 
Enlightenment, of casting aside rational argumentation.  There 
are two mistakes here.  First, Lemley conflates empirical with 
rational, when in fact, reason is a broader genus than the narrow 
species of strict empiricism.  And second, the argument contains 
a false dichotomy.  Rational arguments about morality often 
involve an appeal to a universal sense of justice or fairness—they 
are explicitly not particularistic.  Indeed, a vast literature 
explores empirically the regularities in people’s moral judgments.  
There is great deal of empiricism, in other words, about moral 
intuitions.  So in both senses Lemley is wrong.  Those of us with 
deontological commitments do not eschew reason, we rely on it.  
 
17 Mikhail, supra note 16, at 1057–58 (footnote omitted). For Holmes’s views, 
see ALSCHULER, supra note 16, at 25. 
18 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 11 
(1999). 
19 Mikhail, supra note 16, at 1092 (footnote omitted) (quoting POSNER, supra 
note 18, at 11). 
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And we are not resistant to empirical proof; we are often hungry 
for it and interested in it—the difference is that a deontologist is 
interested in shared judgments about right and wrong, rather 
than a strict and exclusive interest in empirical data about the 
consequences of different courses of action. 
Perhaps it is FBIP that is “remarkably resistant to 
evidentiary challenge.”  This appears to be so, at least when it 
comes to proof of shared judgments about right and wrong.  It 
turns out there is an extensive literature showing—empirically 
and scientifically—that there are indeed widespread shared 
judgments about right and wrong,20 including judgments about 
ownership, possession, and property rights, and even judgments 
about ownership of intangibles such as ideas and personal 
creations. 
1. Empirical Evidence for Deontological Reasoning 
Evidence has mounted in the past twenty-five years or so 
that there are very extensive overlaps in peoples’ basic moral 
intuitions.  Indeed, it has become common in some circles to 
speak confidently of “moral universals.”  And in general, recent 
research suggests that quick first impressions—based on 
intuition—are more reliable bases of judgment than many would 
suppose.21 
Consider, for example, a well-known hypothetical situation 
designed to explore moral judgments.  In the basic version of this 
scenario, called “the trolley problem,” a person observes that an 
out-of-control trolley is heading for five people and will kill them 
unless it is diverted.22  The only way to divert the trolley is to pull 
a switch that turns the train onto a different track—where it will 
kill one person.  In another basic variation, the only way to save 
the five people is to throw a large person, standing on a walkway 
above the train track, in front of the trolley to stop it. 
Students of moral theory use these and many other 
variations on the trolley problem to explore moral judgments.  
But an empirical branch of this field uses the trolley problem to 
test moral judgment across cultures, age groups, and other 
 
20 See infra Section I.C.1. 
21 See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING 
WITHOUT THINKING (2005). 
22 F.M. Kamm, Harming Some To Save Others, 57 PHIL. STUD. 227, 228 (1989); 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale L.J. 1395, 1395 (1985). 
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demographic categories.  In one study, researchers asked people 
from many countries about two simple variations on the famous 
“trolley problem” and found widespread agreement about which 
actions were right and wrong across ethnicities, religions, ages, 
and backgrounds: 
[A]cross a variety of nationalities, ethnicities, religions, ages, 
educational backgrounds (including exposure to moral 
philosophy), and both genders, shared principles exist.  That is, 
across every subpopulation tested, scenario 1 (turning the train) 
elicited a significantly higher proportion of permissibility 
judgments than scenario 2 (shoving the man), suggesting that 
one of . . . three [common moral] principles . . . or their 
combination, guided the moral judgments made by each group.23 
Scholars such as Donald E. Brown have also documented 
what are called “human universals”—consistent moral judgments 
across cultures about important subjects such as murder, rape, 
and theft.24  Anthropologists, in particular, have revised the 
widespread view of “cultural relativism” that prevailed in an 
earlier era, in part by revisiting some famous case studies 
purporting to show aberrant practices, and revising those 
findings in light of more detailed research.25  But some 
philosophers are less than convinced.26 
 
23 Marc Hauser et al., A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and 
Justifications, 22 MIND & LANGUAGE 1, 15–16 (2007). The three principles are 
explained by the authors: 
[T]he observed pattern of judgments was consistent with at least three 
possible moral distinctions: (1) Foreseen versus intended harm (Principle of 
the double effect): it is less permissible to cause harm as an intended means 
to an end than as a foreseen consequence of an end; (2) Redirection versus 
introduction of threat: it is less permissible to cause harm by introducing a 
new threat (e.g. pushing a man) than by redirecting an existing threat (e.g. 
turning an out-of-control train onto a man); and (3) Personal versus 
impersonal: it is less permissible to cause harm by direct physical contact 
than by an indirect means. The first two distinctions have been discussed 
in the philosophical literature as the content of plausible moral principles, 
while the third has emerged from considerations of both behavioral and 
neurophysiological evidence. 
Id. at 15. 
24 DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 6 (1991). 
25 See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF 
HUMAN NATURE 23 (2002); see also BROWN, supra note 24, at 10. 
26 See Mark Alfano & Don Loeb, Experimental Moral Philosophy, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/ 
entries/experimental-moral. 
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Part of the misunderstanding about moral intuition has to do 
with the nature of intuition itself.  Many casual observers equate 
intuition with a “retreat from evidence,” meaning a substitute for 
empirical observation or even scientific fact.27  But this view 
seriously misunderstands the nature of moral reasoning.  One 
prominent explanation of moral judgments is that they are based 
not on irrational intuitions, but instead on a “universal moral 
grammar” that is inherent to all human beings.28  This concept is 
based on an analogy to Noam Chomsky’s famous finding that all 
humans are born with a common human template for grammar 
and language.29  The key point is how researchers learned of this 
template.  It was not itself invented speculatively, but instead 
was induced from extensive empirical observations.  In the world 
of language, the universal grammar notion came to prominence 
because researchers constantly observed that native speakers 
without sophisticated language training “just knew” proper word 
usage and sentence structure, even with regard to words and 
sentence types they had never encountered before.30 
This led linguists to look for further evidence of an 
ingrained, “hard-wired” capacity for language and language 
structure—evidence which has mounted ever since. 
Moral philosophers familiar with empirical studies of moral 
judgment across cultures posited a similar type of template, only 
in the moral sphere.  Observations, such as those centered on the 
trolley problem, confirm that people from all cultures and with 
all education backgrounds share similar judgments concerning 
right and wrong actions in several basic human situations.31 
2. Moral Reasoning About Property 
A different strain of empirical research has some important 
things to say about moral judgments concerning IP.  
Psychologists who study children’s responses to moral issues are 
 
27 Lemley, supra note 1, at 1337. 
28 See JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION: RAWLS’ LINGUISTIC 
ANALOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT 15 (2011). 
29 Id. at 4. 
30 See VIVIAN COOK & MARK NEWSON, CHOMSKY’S UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR: AN 
INTRODUCTION 55–59 (3d ed. 2007); RAY JACKENDOFF, PATTERNS IN THE MIND: 
LANGUAGE AND HUMAN NATURE 108–10 (1994); STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE 
INSTINCT 44–45, 285–88 (1994). 
31 Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 13, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html. 
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interested in a number of issues, including the way moral 
sensibility develops as children grow.  But one subfield in the 
area of children’s moral judgment is of particular relevance to 
issues of right and wrong as they pertain to intellectual property.  
A group of studies with children centers on questions of 
ownership.  A brief review of these studies will be helpful in 
exploring further the issue of shared moral intuitions. 
In a typical experiment, pre-school age children are exposed 
to a person handling an object.  The object is then left and picked 
up by another person.  A robust finding is that children infer 
ownership from first possession:  “[T]he first possession heuristic 
guides children’s ownership inferences.  The findings provide the 
first evidence that preschoolers can infer who owns what, when 
not explicitly told, and when not reasoning about objects with 
which they are personally acquainted.”32 
Research shows that the first possession heuristic extends to 
ideas as well as physical objects.  As one article title in this field 
says, “Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to 
Ideas.”33  At the same time, children are also able to distinguish 
ownership from possession.  In studies where an object moves 
among a group of people, children track the person that others 
look to for permission to take possession.  This person they infer 
is the owner.  In this and other studies, it has been demonstrated 
that even very young children make sophisticated judgments 
about issues of ownership.  The authors of one study put it this 
way: 
[C]hildren (6–8 years old) determine ownership of both objects 
and ideas based on who first establishes possession of the object 
or idea.  Study 2 shows that children use another principle of 
object ownership, control of permission—an ability to restrict 
others’ access to the entity in question—to determine idea 
ownership.  In Study 3, we replicate these findings with 
different idea types.  In Study 4, we determine that children 
will not apply ownership to every entity, demonstrating that 
they do not apply ownership to a common word.  Taken  
 
 
 
32 Ori Friedman & Karen R. Neary, Determining Who Owns What: Do Children 
Infer Ownership from First Possession, 107 COGNITION 829, 829 (2008). 
33 Alex Shaw, Vivian Li & Kristina R. Olson, Children Apply Principles of 
Physical Ownership to Ideas, 36 COGNITIVE SCI. 1383, 1383 (2012). 
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together, these results suggest that, like adults, children as 
young as 6 years old apply rules from ownership not only to 
objects but to ideas as well.34 
Other studies, concentrated on creative labor, are also highly 
pertinent to moral judgments about IP.  For example, when 
presented with a conflict between someone who abandons an 
object and someone who finds it, adults are more likely to 
endorse the first owner when he or she has invested creative 
labor in the object.35  In one study, children were shown an object, 
such as modeling clay, owned by person A, then observed as 
person B expended labor in making something creative—like a 
small figure—with the clay.  In this and similar studies, “creative 
labor increases the likelihood that 3-year-old and 4-year-old 
children will endorse the creator and not the original owner of 
materials as the owner of a final product.”36  And the instinct to 
recognize creative effort extends both to children’s own creations 
and those of others: 
[W]e found that children applied the same rules to their own 
property and to the property of the person they were directly 
interacting with.  Although this behavior may have arisen as a 
by-product of the cooperative social setting of the experiment, 
our results do indicate that young children are able to overcome 
a previously established bias to maximize their own gain.37 
Beyond the general assimilation of ideas to objects when it 
comes to notions of ownership, children also have a distinct 
reaction to plagiarism.  In one article, the authors show that 
adults, older children from 9 to 11 years old, and children from 5 
to 8 years old all respond with negative moral judgments about 
plagiarism.38  Original creativity is more highly valued, and one 
who copies and claims credit is assessed negatively even by these 
very young children.  The study authors found that only 3 and 4 
year olds fail to distinguish between original creators and 
 
34 Id. 
35 James K. Beggan & Ellen M. Brown, Association as a Psychological 
Justification for Ownership, 128 J. PSYCHOL. 365, 369–70, 372 (1994). 
36 Patricia Kanngiesser, Nathalia Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood, The Effect of 
Creative Labor on Property-Ownership Transfer by Preschool Children and Adults, 
21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1236, 1238 (2010). 
37 Id. at 1240. 
38 Kristina R. Olson & Alex Shaw, ‘No Fair, Copycat!’: What Children’s Response 
to Plagiarism Tells Us About Their Understanding of Ideas, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL 
SCI. 431, 433, 438 (2011). 
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plagiarists.39  As the authors conclude, “by age 5 years old, 
children understand that others have ideas and dislike the 
copying of these ideas.”40 
What these studies show is that there are strong regularities 
in people’s thinking about ownership, fairness, and the 
importance of creative labor.  And because the studies are cross-
cultural, involve children, or both, they support the idea that 
moral judgments about these issues may be less due to 
socialization in a particular culture and more due to a basic 
shared moral sense. 
These results contradict the notion that moral judgments 
about ownership and creative labor are highly idiosyncratic and 
unstable.  Critics of deontological theories who argue against it 
as being “unscientific” should take note.  As one commentator put 
it, in traversing the arguments of the critic Richard Posner: 
Posner fails to come to terms in any serious way with the 
hypothesis that human beings share a sense of justice rich 
enough to support a universal system of rights and obligations, 
including the right not to be murdered.  This hypothesis is 
plausible and supported by a considerable body of empirical 
evidence.  Throughout [his book] Problematics, Posner adopts 
the mantle of science and pokes fun at philosophers for being 
unscientific.  But in truth, it is his relativism, not their 
universalism, that seems out of touch with modern science.41 
The same may well be said of those who criticize deontological 
theories of IP law.  It is they who are out of touch with modern 
science.  Hence, even if one rejects the systematic deontological 
systems of Kant or Rawls, one must still confront the fact that, 
empirically speaking, when it comes to issues of property rights 
many people revert to a common, innate template for making 
moral judgments.  Paradoxically, there is empirical evidence that 
when it comes to moral issues, people are not primarily 
empiricists.42  They rely on a set of moral judgments so common 
and pervasive they are close to being universal.  And whatever 
else they are, they are not simply raw, untestable, unstable  
 
 
 
39 Id. at 437. 
40 Id. at 431. 
41 Mikhail, supra note 16, at 1062. 
42 Olson & Shaw, supra note 38, at 438. 
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beliefs.  They seem to take on a coherent shape and pattern.  
They are, in other words, not a matter of blind faith, but a type of 
reason unto themselves.43 
D. Non-Empiricists Are Outside the Circle of Reasoned 
Argument 
FBIP implicitly presents the reader with a syllogism: 
(1) empirical data about consequences are the only rational form 
of evidence in reasoned argumentation; (2) deontologists, and all 
nonstrict empiricists, rely on evidence other than empirical data 
about consequences; and therefore (3) nonstrict empiricists rely 
on irrational forms of evidence.  Put succinctly, they are 
irrational—not susceptible to rational persuasion. 
This is, once again, an impressive performance: it skillfully 
draws a circle to exclude nonstrict empiricists, and then says, in 
effect, “look, they have placed themselves outside the great Circle 
of Reason.  Burn them at the stake!”—Okay, I made that last 
part up. 
But to work, one must accept the terms of the syllogism.  
And, of course, I do not.  I reject the major premise, and therefore 
resist the conclusion.  Once again, I would argue that reason is 
not coextensive with “empirical data regarding consequences.”  
To illustrate, I will use two examples.  The first is intentionally 
incendiary while the second merely serves as a concrete example.  
The examples illustrate the two basic objections to 
consequentialism.  One is that it can lead to outcomes that are 
morally reprehensible.  The other is that it is impractical.  I 
address them both briefly. 
In its pure form, utilitarian thinking can lead to things like 
this:  Given a certain demand for literature in a society, it could 
be plausible that the best way to obtain a steady stream of 
consumable literature would be to enslave a small group of high-
 
43 Caveat: Does all this mean that we should base IP policy on the moral 
intuitions of children—that we should adopt an absolutist, simplistic “strong 
property” approach to IP rights in all cases, based on studies of children with toys 
and clay figures? Of course not. The point is simply that deontological reasoning is 
founded on shared judgments about right and wrong behavior. Elaborating detailed 
rules requires deeper and more extensive reasoning; and one important component 
of this reasoning will be empirical evidence of consequences. Put simply, 
deontological reason is a valid form of reason, as shown by evidence of shared 
judgments of right and wrong. It is not blind faith, and it is not impervious to 
empirical evidence about consequences. 
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output writers.  Under threat of death or severe punishment, put 
them on a strict quota of words per day or chapters per month of 
novels, plays, short stories, etc.  Feed them and house them but 
otherwise pay them nothing.  If the literature they produce is 
even mediocre, many dedicated readers might be tolerably 
satisfied.  The cost of each book or story would be minimal; just 
the cost of confining and supporting the writers, spread over all 
the readers of their literature. 
How could this be defended?  In a large enough society, the 
aggregated satisfaction of the readers might well outweigh the 
intense and concentrated disutility—that is, agony—of the 
writers.  If net total satisfaction is all that matters, the small 
pleasure of the many could dominate the deep pain of the few. 
Of course, it might bother some people that their literature is 
generated in such a fashion.  That might reduce their utility in 
consuming it.  But maybe not enough to make the practice 
overall net negative in terms of total utility.  One also wonders 
whether being “bothered” in this way contains at least a hint of 
feelings of intrinsic right and wrong: shades of a deontological 
pull?  The point is not to predict what the net utility numbers 
would be.  It is to point out the simple fact that if the numbers 
came out net positive, a consistent utilitarian would have to 
approve of the practice.  The motto “live by the numbers, die by 
the numbers” might be all too appropriate. 
In short, all sorts of things most of us find morally repulsive 
might be possible under a strictly utilitarian setup.  It is that 
sense of moral repulsion that, in effect, constitutes one 
traditional counterargument to pure-form utilitarianism. 
E. The Calculability Critique 
The second critique of utilitarianism is that it is impractical.  
It is too difficult to determine the net consequences of almost any 
simple action, which means it is hopeless to attempt to make a 
strict form of consequentialism; the comprehensive basis for all 
social policy. 
This objection is about the limits of calculability.  There are 
several dimensions to this.  First, it is very difficult to predict all 
the consequences of a given action.  This is, of course, well known 
in the literature on causation.  Even deciding on what is an 
“important” or “proximate” cause of a downstream event is 
fraught with complexity.  Matters become even more difficult 
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when we take into account interaction effects—when we try to 
predict how one decision may affect others, and how related 
actions may interact with the first decision to produce final 
outcomes. 
Here is an example of this dimension of calculability.  Let us 
say we are deciding whether the owners of internet platforms 
have to take responsibility for the copyright status of material 
that users post on the platforms.  One proposal is to generally 
shield the platform owner from liability, subject to a duty to shut 
down the online posting activity of specifically identified, high-
volume copyright violators.  The other proposal is to raise the 
platform owners’ level of responsibility—to make them liable in 
more circumstances for online postings that infringe copyrights, 
whether the person posting the material can be identified or not, 
and whether the platform owner knew the material was 
infringing before being told, or not. 
What are the consequences of this decision?  The high-shield 
proposal will certainly benefit the platform owner; it need not 
worry much about ruinous copyright infringement liability.  But 
perhaps the creators of copyrighted works will suffer if this 
shielding cuts into their ability to make money?  Perhaps.  But 
then again the relative openness of the platform may provide a 
forum for more creators.  Perhaps amateur creators will gain a 
larger audience.  Perhaps users of the platforms will benefit from 
a greater diversity of creative works in the low-copyright-
enforcement milieu.  On the other hand, perhaps the low-
shield/high-liability option will lead to the creation of 
sophisticated filtering software that helps to identify copyrighted 
works.  Maybe this software will abet censorship.  Maybe it will 
lead to automated compensation mechanisms that help identify 
specific instances where copyrighted works are used, and help 
direct small payments to creators.  And perhaps this will lead to 
more creators entering the field in hopes of making a living.  But 
then again if platform companies have to pay copyright 
infringement claims on a regular basis they may innovate less.  
They may not have the money to invest in creating their own 
studios for making videos and music.  This may cause artists who 
would have benefitted from these investments to be worse off 
than they otherwise would be.  Perhaps some of these artists who 
would have benefitted will leave the creative industries and the 
world will lose out on a masterpiece or two.  One or more may 
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even die in despair, fail to have children they otherwise would 
have had.  Maybe one of these unborn children would have been 
the scientist to cure cancer or discover cheap, safe fusion energy.  
And so on. 
When we spin out the potential consequences in this way, 
what jumps out is the hopelessness of comprehensive 
consequentialism.  As one philosopher put it:  “We may not be 
strictly without a clue, but we are virtually without a clue.  The 
trouble for consequentialism then is that the foreseeable 
consequences of an action are so often a drop in the ocean of its 
actual consequences.”44  Even an attempt to mitigate the problem 
by assigning probabilities to various outcomes will not save the 
day.  This does not eliminate the complexity of the problem; it 
just moves it to a different task—assigning weights to events.  
Put simply, “if utilitarians are worried about the impracticality 
objection, they should not turn to expected utility utilitarianism.  
That theory does not provide the basis for a cogent reply to the 
objection.”45  It is easy to see the force of this critique when 
applied to IP law.  To begin, there is almost no area of IP law 
that has been studied extensively enough to warrant a “net grand 
total” conclusion.  The many empirical studies in this field often 
consider only one isolated doctrine or practice; very few are 
anywhere near comprehensive.46  So even in this canonical case 
 
44 James Lenman, Consequentialism and Cluelessness, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
342, 350 (2000). 
45 Fred Feldman, Actual Utility, the Objection from Impracticality, and the Move 
to Expected Utility, 129 PHIL. STUD. 49, 49 (2006). 
46 See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen 
When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term 
Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 29 (2013) (arguing that end of copyright term 
does not reduce availability of formerly copyrighted works); Eric Budish, Benjamin 
N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research?: Evidence 
from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2045 (2015) (proposing that 
effective patent term distorts pharmaceutical R&D, such that drugs requiring 
shorter development time, and hence longer effective terms, receive more R&D 
attention than drugs that require longer development times); see generally Robert P. 
Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 12–14 (2016) (summarizing empirical research on absolute 
liability in intellectual property). There is, however, one possible exception. It seems 
safe to say that removing patent protection from the pharmaceutical and chemical 
industries would work a serious hardship on those industries as currently 
constituted. See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the 
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1255, 1325 (2009) (noting that study focused only on patent doctrine). Even here 
though, conclusions can only be tentative, because the studies concentrate on the 
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we cannot conclude that we have sufficient data on which to base 
a permanent and comprehensive decision about the consequences 
of eliminating IP protection for these industries. 
II. INCLUSIONARY, PLURALISTIC IP THEORY 
Having dealt with the critique first, it is time to turn to a 
different task.  I will summarize the main arguments in my book, 
Justifying IP.  Having now explained what I did not say, contrary 
to FBIP’s characterization, it is time to spell out what I did say. 
The critique in FBIP might be boiled down to this: nonstrict 
empiricists are true believers.  They will not listen to reason.  
They think they have a lock on the truth. 
Contrast that characterization with this statement from the 
introductory chapter of JIP.  Do these sound like the words of a 
true believer?  Consider: 
Although I have arrived at my understanding of foundations 
over many years of study, I do not believe my ideas have any 
claim to exclusivity.  The deontological foundations I describe in 
Part II are not the only plausible grounding for the field.  As I 
said earlier, the current data (in my opinion anyway) are close 
to forming a lock-solid utilitarian case for IP.  More data might 
tip the balance, leading me and perhaps others to believe that 
the field is basically all about net social utility, or perhaps that 
it can be justified by either set of core values, utilitarian or 
deontological rights.47 
And then, I expanded on my pluralistic approach.  I reviewed the 
pluralist democratic theory of the late John Rawls, who argued 
that people with divergent foundational commitments could 
nevertheless respect and interact with each other, and thereby 
create a shared or common “public space” that allows active 
participation in a thriving democratic society.  I argued that this 
same pluralistic spirit could work well for IP law: 
My theory of IP includes this foundational pluralism.  I am open 
to more or better evidence on the net social effects of IP 
protection.  For me, a lock-solid utilitarian case might someday 
unseat deontological rights as the field’s foundation.  In the 
 
industries in their current form. It is quite conceivable that after some fundamental 
restructuring—for example, government subsidies or strict regulation of consumer 
advertising expenditures relative to R&D investments—a pharmaceutical or 
chemical industry without IP rights might be viable. 
47 MERGES, supra note 3, at 9. 
FINAL_MERGES 2/14/2017  10:48 PM 
2016]   AGAINST UTILITARIAN FUNDAMENTALISM 701 
meantime, the great virtue of pluralism is that I can engage in a 
meaningful way with those who are already convinced of the 
utilitarian account, those who hold firmly to deontological 
rights, and those who place their faith in other foundations 
altogether.  Midlevel principles provide our common space, our 
place of engagement.  They are like a musical score, allowing us 
all to play together, even if we disagree about the deep 
wellsprings or ultimate significance of our shared performance, 
our common musical practice.  The midlevel principles allow us 
to be tolerant about questions of ultimate importance.  In my 
theory, the conceptual hierarchy includes a ground floor that is 
airy and capacious.  There is room at the bottom.48 
Again, is this the claim of a close-minded fanatic?  Re-
reading these passages, and then looking at the text of FBIP, one 
is led to fairly ask:  Does this article show any awareness of the 
book it was critiquing? 
A. The Nuts and Bolts of Pluralism 
So how does this pluralism work—how can one “conduct 
business” with others with whom one stridently disagrees on the 
basic justification for the field of IP law? 
The fulcrum on which this turns is the “midlevel principle.”  
The terminology is borrowed from legal philosopher Jules 
Coleman, who describes the midlevel as beyond the deepest level 
of analysis—that is, philosophical bedrock, what I call 
foundations—yet below the level of doctrine and specific legal 
rules.49 
The idea of midlevel principles describes both a positive 
feature of the IP landscape and a theoretical construct supportive 
of foundational pluralism.  As a positive matter, IP scholars and 
practitioners with all sorts of divergent foundational 
commitments come together to argue policy all the time.  The IP 
literature, case law, and IP scholars’ blogs are full of back-and-
forth over specific cases, doctrines, and rules in IP law.  Indeed, 
Mark Lemley and I regularly argue and oftentimes agree on 
specific policy proposals.50  There is obviously some set of shared 
 
48 Id. at 10. 
49 Id. at 140; JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 54 (2001). 
50 To take two examples from what would be a very long list: (1) we are both 
concerned that software patent claims have been allowed to become too broad and 
amorphous and have expressed highly compatible ideas regarding how to reverse 
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understandings that allow us to interact and cooperate despite 
disagreements about why a society has an IP system in the first 
place.  My view is that we interact at a level beyond the 
foundational one; we share agreement on certain midlevel 
principles of the IP field such as efficiency and proportionality.  
On the practical level, we interact and exchange ideas.  On the 
theoretical level, it is these midlevel principles that make this 
possible. 
Midlevel principles have a dual character.  They serve as a 
“bridge” between pluralist foundational commitments and 
detailed doctrines and case outcomes.  At this level, they are 
meant to serve as the equivalent of shared basic commitments in 
the “public” and “political” sphere described by Rawls in his later 
book Political Liberalism.51  That is, midlevel principles supply a 
shared language, a set of conceptual categories consistent with 
multiple diverse foundational commitments.  They are more 
abstract and operate at a higher level than specific doctrines and 
case outcomes, but they are pitched in a language that is distinct 
from that of foundational commitments.  They create a shared 
public space in which abstract, noncase-specific policy 
discussions can take place.52 
There are four specific midlevel principles I identify in IP 
law: proportionality, efficiency, nonremoval or the public domain, 
and dignity.  These are the four principles that stand out in the 
broad sweep of IP cases across all doctrinal areas.  They 
represent themes, tropes, and motifs that I see over and over 
again when judges and, to a lesser extent, legislators grapple 
with difficult cases.  These principles span and tie together 
multiple, diverse areas of IP doctrine.53 
 
this trend, and (2) we co-authored a brief championing a certain interpretation of a 
provision in the new—as of 2011—America Invents Act concerning the definition of 
prior art. Our joint brief in the latter case relies on several policy arguments, 
including a respect for the established tradition of interpretation in past Acts, and a 
concern that the alternate interpretation runs contrary to the policy of preventing 
over-long exploitation of an invention prior to the filing of a patent application on 
the invention. See Brief for 42 Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms., Inc., Fed. Cir. 
Case No. 2016-1284 (March 14, 2016). This later policy depends in part on a concern 
with public reliance on the nonexistence of a patent—a variant on the “nonremoval” 
principle described in JIP. MERGES, supra note 3, at 141–42. 
51 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 39 (1993). 
52 MERGES, supra note 3, at 140. 
53 Id. at 139. 
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The idea behind midlevel principles may well be familiar.  
My version of it derives, as many will recognize, from John 
Rawls’s conception of pluralism in a modern state.  For Rawls, 
“public reason” plays much the same role as midlevel principles 
do in my approach to IP.  He calls the shared deliberative space 
created by public reason an “overlapping consensus,” and this is 
very much in the spirit of what I am describing in this Essay.  
Midlevel principles create an overlapping consensus among 
people with differing beliefs about the ultimate normative 
foundations of IP law.  These principles provide a common 
conceptual vocabulary for conducting policy debates.  They 
bracket, and in a sense transcend, disagreements about ultimate 
issues, while tying together disparate strands of doctrine and 
practice. 
Cass Sunstein has a similar theory, the idea of “incompletely 
theorized agreement” (“ITA”).54  Sunstein’s notion of an ITA 
applies primarily to judicial opinions and legal reasoning.  The 
idea is that judges customarily avoid deep foundational 
theorizing in their opinions as a way of safeguarding pluralism; 
one may lose a case, based on conventional doctrine, precedent, 
and legal reasoning, without having one’s deepest convictions 
rejected.  Rawls’s theory of overlapping consensus is aimed at a 
much different issue: whether individual citizens need to share a 
comprehensive moral/theological/foundational worldview to join 
together in liberal society.  For various reasons, Rawls says that 
individuals often have deep foundational beliefs; that society 
should be organized so that people with reasonable but 
conflicting basic beliefs can live and function together effectively;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35–36 
(1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1733, 1735 n.8 (1995) (suggesting an idea very similar to overlapping 
consensus). For an interesting and concise introduction to the ideas of overlapping 
consensus and incompletely theorized agreements, see Lawrence Solum, Legal 
Theory Lexicon: Overlapping Consensus & Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Aug. 14, 2016, 11:22 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal 
theory/2016/08/legal-theory-lexicon-overlapping-consensus-incompletely-theorized-
agreements.html. 
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and that the overlapping consensus that fosters this effective 
coexistence should go beyond a mere operational détente to 
embrace certain shared or “public” moral values.55 
B. Plenty To Talk About 
The best way to make midlevel principles concrete is to give 
some examples.  We can begin with a specific case, Helsinn 
Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd.,56 which interpreted an 
important provision in the America Invents Act (“AIA”) of 2011.  
The district court held that the AIA implicitly overturned 
longstanding law on the question of what constitutes “sale” of a 
patented invention.  Inventions that are on sale before a patent 
application is filed can invalidate the patent, so the ruling has 
significant impact on the law of patent validity. 
In a co-authored brief asking the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit to reverse this decision, the 
authors of FBIP and JIP made a number of arguments.57  To 
summarize, they argued: (1) the district court misinterpreted the 
new statute, the AIA; (2) the district court too readily accepted 
that the AIA meant to overturn longstanding precedent from 
over a century on the meaning of “sale”; and (3) the traditional 
policy of limiting an inventor’s ability to profit from an invention, 
and then later file a patent application—sometimes called the 
policy against extension of a monopoly—applied in Helsinn just 
as it always has in prior cases. 
In the terms used in JIP, the first two arguments take place 
at the “top” of the conceptual hierarchy of IP law.  This is where 
the details of doctrines and cases are hashed out.  It is the level 
of analysis in which the traditional lawyer’s toolkit is deployed.  
Arguments from the structure of the statute, from analogy to 
precedent, and the like are typical at this level. 
The third argument sounds more in policy than in statutory 
construction or precedential reasoning strictly speaking.  
Admittedly, precedent often embodies and supports a 
longstanding policy, so there is some conceptual overlap between 
the first level, rules and doctrines, and the second, midlevel 
 
55 For a helpful comparison of Rawls’s overlapping consensus and Sunstein’s 
ITA, see Scott J. Shapiro, Fear of Theory, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 390–91 (1997) 
(reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 54). 
56 No. CV 11-3962 (MLC), 2016 WL 832089, at *45 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016). 
57 See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 50, at 2. 
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principles.  To use the midlevel principles described in JIP, the 
policy argument in Helsinn could be said to embody (1) the 
nonremoval principle, that is, nonremoval of information from 
the public domain; and/or (2) the efficiency principle, because the 
extension of monopoly that occurs when an invention can be sold 
for some time before a patent is filed on it may over-reward an 
inventor—by giving in effect an extended patent term.  Over-
rewards of this type may waste social resources.  The policy 
argument in Helsinn also embodies efficiency in encouraging 
early disclosure of an invention, which both adds to the stock of 
current knowledge—when the patent application is published or 
the patent issued—and leads to earlier release of protected ideas 
into the public domain, because earlier filing leads to earlier 
expiration of the patent. 
These midlevel policies are consistent with a number of 
deeper foundational commitments.  For a utilitarian, the 
efficiency principle goes “all the way down” to foundations.  Only 
if all aspects of the IP system, when aggregated, produce net 
social benefits would a strict utilitarian even be discussing the 
policy issues in Helsinn.  And a particularly thorough utilitarian 
might require each rule, doctrine, and detail of IP law to be net 
positive in its overall consequences. 
On the other hand, one might be skeptical of the overall 
utilitarian case for IP and still agree with the midlevel principles 
at work in Helsinn.  If, for example, one believes that rewarding 
creative work with limited property rights promotes individual 
autonomy and self-expression, it still makes sense to structure 
the IP system in an efficient way.  Operational efficiency, in 
other words, is in no way inconsistent with foundational 
skepticism about the utilitarian case for IP as a whole.  For a 
person such as this, the efficiency rationale in Helsinn might be 
persuasive.  In addition, or perhaps as an alternative, a 
utilitarian skeptic might still be concerned with extending 
property rights to include material that is already in the public 
domain.  A strict reading of what constitutes “the public domain,” 
which is required to disagree with the district court ruling in 
Helsinn, is entirely consistent with a belief that in general 
property rights ought to be available for new creative works for 
deontological reasons.  An insistence on a broad definition of the 
public domain, in other words, equates to a stringent definition of 
protecting only what is truly “new.” 
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The point here is to show how two students of IP with quite 
divergent views about the field’s foundations might be able to 
discuss, and agree on, not only case outcomes but policy 
rationales for those outcomes.  This is the work done by the 
midlevel principles described in JIP. 
Schematically, we might describe this as follows: 
 
Conceptual Theory Level Arguments 
1.  Rules & Doctrines Statutory construction 
 Precedent 
2.  Midlevel Principles Longstanding practice—efficiency 
 Nonextension of monopoly—nonremoval 
3.  Foundations: Utilitarian Net positive social welfare 
     Foundations: Deontological Part of an efficient system of deserved 
rewards 
 
The point is simple:  Argumentation can take place at levels 1 
and 2 without the need for deep agreement, all the way down to 
level 3.  This explains why the authors of FBIP and JIP could 
cooperate and agree on an amicus brief in Helsinn.  It also tends 
to refute the argument of FBIP that those with divergent 
foundational commitments have nothing to say to each other.  
Indeed, there is much to be gained from ignoring foundational 
disagreements when what is needed is discussion and 
cooperation on operational details of the IP system. 
C. Another Example 
A long line of cases confronts a common difficulty in the 
entertainment industries.  At time 1, a creator licenses his or her 
work to a company that plans to exploit it in a conventional 
entertainment medium: print publication, film, television, etc.  At 
time 2, a new medium comes into being: videocassettes, DVDs, 
the Internet, etc.  A contract signed at time 1 perhaps includes a 
clause giving the licensee company rights to use the work “in any 
medium.”  The creator at time 2 seeks to license his or her work 
to a different licensee, one that specializes in the new medium; or 
the creator seeks to execute a new, separate license with the 
original licensee, on the theory that the original license does not 
extend to the new medium.  What result? 
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Courts have wrangled with these issues over the years,58 as 
have scholars who have studied them.59  A wide range of 
arguments has been marshaled in the debates over how to 
approach these issues.  Some arguments depend on the specific 
contractual language in a particular case.  This again is part of 
basic legal argumentation; it occupies the top-level in the 
structure described in JIP.  Another set of arguments abstracts 
from individual cases.  These often sound in default rules or 
canons of contractual construction.  For example, one 
interpretative canon, often invoked, is that contracts should be 
construed against the drafter of the agreement.  This has been 
applied in the “new medium” copyright cases with courts split on 
the issue.60 
Another set of arguments moves down a level and invokes 
general policy considerations.  For example, those who argue that 
an original licensee should naturally have rights in a new 
medium often emphasize the need for a corporate licensee to 
count on having full rights over work in its catalogue.  This can 
be seen as an application of the general common law principle of 
accession under which, for example, one who owns a tree has 
rights over the fruit it produces.61  These are at root efficiency 
arguments. 
Those arguing that original creators should normally win 
these cases point out that including new technologies under the 
grant of rights in old contracts deprives creators of a chance to  
 
 
58 See, e.g., Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 325–26 (1920) (analyzing a 
license to theatrical play, which licensee claimed included the right to make a film); 
Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 630 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that “motion 
picture” is not necessarily limited to a series of images on celluloid, but rather is 
broad enough to include videocassette); Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 168 A.D.2d 11, 
15–16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (stating that video is not covered by clause granting 
right to broadcast over future devices similar to television). 
59 See, e.g., Stacey M. Byrnes, Symposium, Copyright Licenses, New Technology 
and Default Rules: Converging Media, Diverging Courts?, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 
243, 244 (2000); Kate Darling, Contracting About the Future: Copyright and New 
Media, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 485, 485 (2012). 
60 Compare Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1391 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that 
ambiguity there should be construed against the drafter-grantee, especially given 
the relative expertise and experience of the two parties), with S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (disapproving the presumption against 
drafter-grantor in context of construing scope of copyright license). 
61 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009). 
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make extra profit.  The requirement of a new license seems 
fairer, they argue, because it gives more compensation to the 
creator as against the corporate licensee. 
One may engage this debate at these levels, and participate 
in its details in full.  Engagement is consistent with multiple, 
divergent foundational commitments.  A utilitarian would want 
to balance the transaction costs of additional licenses against the 
incentive effects of lodging the rights with either the original 
creator or the licensee.  A Kantian might emphasize the added 
autonomy flowing to creators from the opportunity to choose 
which licensee will exploit the work in each new medium that 
comes along.62  Again, a schematic representation will help 
clarify the different levels of argumentation: 
 
Conceptual Theory Level Arguments 
1.  Rules & Doctrines Contract Interpretation 
 Canons of Contract Construction 
2.  Midlevel Principles Efficiency: Settled Expectations for 
Licensees 
 Fairness: Original Purpose of Copyright 
3.  Foundations: Utilitarian Net Positive Social Welfare 
     Foundations: Deontological Creator Autonomy: Distributive 
Justice—higher incomes for original 
creators 
 
As with the discussion of Helsinn, the point is simply that 
argument at levels 1 and 2 is quite possible without agreement 
about level 3 commitments.  People with divergent foundational 
beliefs can and do engage each other in spirited and productive 
policy debates.  They have, in other words, much to say to each 
other. 
 
62 See Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of 
Transaction Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 150 (2011) (“[I]f independent production 
serves important social values beyond efficiency, then we might consider bearing 
slightly higher transaction costs than might be dictated by a strictly efficiency-based 
viewpoint. Put differently, we might be willing to accept higher transaction costs if 
they are shown to serve an important social purpose. Which means, of course, 
accepting that independence has distinct value, in and of itself, apart from its 
contributions to efficiency.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is appropriate, here at the end of this Essay, to talk about 
Kant’s Kingdom of Ends.  Kant believed—on the basis of 
extensive and elaborate rational discourse—that all people 
should be treated as “ends in themselves.”63  With respect and 
dignity, in other words.  The idea is to resist thinking of other 
people as instruments or vehicles or obstacles—as mere things.  
This is true whether we are deploying troops, deciding whether 
to tell the truth, or, in the apposite case, using a scholar’s 
writings to make our own scholarly points. 
Everyone has a right to be treated with dignity, whether 
they subscribe to our own personal, deeply held commitments or 
not.  This is the essence of liberalism.  And it was in this spirit 
that JIP tries to formulate a truly liberal theory of the IP field.  
The book neither predicts nor expects universal agreement; 
rumor has it that the author of JIP does not even know if he 
agrees with himself sometimes.  But JIP does try to show respect 
for all manner of IP theories.  It tries to find a way to figure out 
how IP discourse is possible given the fact of widespread 
disagreement about foundations.  In every sense, JIP builds in 
respect for others and recognition of plural commitments.  You 
can accuse that book of being muddled and wrong; you can accuse 
it of being naïve; you can certainly accuse it of being boring and 
didactic and academic in the sense of quibbling over unimportant 
things.  But it does not seem fair to accuse it of building a theory 
that shuts off discourse and resists reasoned arguments.  Not 
when it tries so hard to be inclusive. 
 
63 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 28–29 
(Jonathan Bennett trans. 2005). 
